British Intelligence Community Research Articles

‘Implacable Enemies’? The Labour Party and the intelligence community in 1920s Britain

ABSTRACT The 1920s marked the first decade in which the Labour Party and the British intelligence community had to work closely together. Their relations during this period, which were often strained, have come to be defined by the Zinoviev letter affair. Allegations that intelligence officials leaked the Zinoviev letter to bring down the Labour government in 1924 have persisted for the last century. Using documents that have been largely unexplored, this article argues that the Zinoviev affair was not an isolated incident. It uses two specific case studies to show that a small number of intelligence officials also leaked sensitive information, in the years before and after 1924, in an attempt to undermine and discredit prominent Labour Party figures. By analysing events in the years before and after the Zinoviev affair, the article illustrates how relations between the British state and the Labour Party fluctuated providing a fresh understanding of Labour Party-intelligence relations during the interwar years.

John le Carré’s The Looking Glass War: imagining the Special Operations Executive – Secret Intelligence Service rivalry as post-war counterfactual history

ABSTRACT Published in 1965, John le Carré’s The Looking Glass War was met with little of the acclaim given to its predecessor, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold. In this article, I propose an alternative reading of the novel, suggesting that it is embroiled in long-running debates within the British intelligence community, specifically the rivalry that occurred between the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Secret Intelligence Service in WW2. Through this, this article explores how le Carré’s novel drew on SOE source material, and how it became part of the wider contest over post-war perceptions of the SOE.

Counting the Cost of Intelligence: The Treasury, National Service and GCHQ

Abstract If one were to choose a few key words to describe the post-war British intelligence community, one of them might well be ‘impecunious’. Scarcity of resource affected the development of intelligence no less than it did British defence policy. Yet while we know much about the political economy of British defence planning, we know almost nothing about intelligence spending. This essay argues that senior Treasury figures were important in the development of the core planning and control mechanisms for the British intelligence community. It uses the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and signals intelligence more broadly to provide illustrative examples of the extreme pressures brought about by the end of the British occupation of Germany, the abolition of National Service as a source of cheap intelligence labour and the rising costs of computers for code breaking. It analyses the impact of the Templer and Hampshire reviews as early attempts to grapple with the accelerating costs of intelligence. Finally, it argues that the most significant intelligence reform, introduced by the Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend in 1968, was the advent of the Cabinet Office Intelligence Co-ordinator as a financial troubleshooter. This was, however, by no means the end of the intelligence community’s financial troubles.

Strategic Horizons: Futures Forecasting and the British Intelligence Community

The article deals with the role and benefit added by the use of horizon scanning in intelligence analysis in the UK. It asserts that horizon scanning as a technique, while not entirely akin to the tradecraft of intelligence analysis, has much to contribute to its success. Specifically, is asserts that a horizon scanning function in the JIO and the Cabinet Office should be made permanent, as bureaucratic tumult in the wake of the 2010 SDSR have left the capability un-staffed, though still established. Within the UK intelligence community, such an organization may have positive roles to play in the processes of challenge, the setting of collection priorities, and overall long-term UK intelligence assessment at the national level.

British spies and Irish rebels: British intelligence and Ireland, 1916-1945

One of the Irish Times' Books of the Year, 2008 Rebellion, partition and a messy peace settlement ensured that Ireland was a constant thorn in Britain's side after 1916. Britain was confronted by the bombs and bullets of militant republicans, the clandestine intrigues of foreign powers and the strategic dangers of Ireland's wartime neutrality - a final, irrevocable step in the country's difficult transition to independence. Using newly-opened archives, this book reveals for the first time how the British intelligence system responded to these threats. It lifts the lid on the underground activities of Britain's secret agencies - MI5, MI6/SIS and the Special Branch. It puts secret intelligence in the context of the government's other sources of information and explores how deep-rooted cultural stereotypes distorted intelligence and shaped perceptions. And it shows how, for decades, British intelligence struggled to cope with Ireland but then rose to the challenge after 1940, largely because the Dublin government began to share its secrets. The author casts light on characters long kept in the shadows - IRA gunrunners, Bolshevik agitators, Nazi agents, Irish loyalists who acted as British spies. His compelling book fills a gap in the history of the British intelligence community and helps explain the twists and turns of Anglo-Irish relations during a time of momentous change. PAUL MCMAHON gained his PhD from Cambridge University.

Dartmouth, Sir Mansfield Cumming and the origins of the British intelligence community

This article uses original archive material to trace the connection between two processes of institutional development that was to result in the British intelligence Community becoming an integral part of government. The first process was the development in the latter part of the nineteenth century of a scheme of education and training for naval cadets at Dartmouth. The importance of this scheme is that it gives, through the Records of Progress and Conduct, a unique insight into the qualities that the first two heads of Britain's foreign intelligence service, and the first head of Britain's signals intelligence unit brought to their respective posts. This article argues that there are a number of timeless and vital competencies which cadets Smith, Sinclair and Hall displayed, albeit in embryonic form, that were critical, later on, in propelling their respective organizations to the centre of government. This is the second process of institutionalization. It is a position that they still occupy today.

Ethical Guidelines in Using Secret Intelligence for Public Security

Pre-emptive intelligence is seen as key to enabling the state to counter terrorism without alienating the minority communities from whom the terrorists hope to gain support. The international nature of jihadist terrorism is placing increasing demands on intelligence agencies to cooperate with new partners overseas and to extend their range of methods, human and technical, to acquire such intelligence. This pressure is creating ethical dilemmas for the agencies at a time when the methods of secret intelligence and their impact on individual rights are the subject of public controversy. This article discusses the implications of the requirement to produce and share actionable high-value intelligence, and suggests a set of ethical guidelines for the British intelligence community. These guidelines aim to help sustain public confidence in intelligence work and in the directions in which this work must develop in order to generate the pre-emptive intelligence needed for public security.

SOE's Foreign Currency Transactions

This article provides an account of the work of the Finance (D/Fin) Directorate of the Special Operations Executive in acquiring foreign currency for use by the British intelligence community and the service departments during the Second World War. This activity earned SOE the gratitude of the Bank of England, which had experienced mounting difficulties in the acquisition of such currency. SOE's involvement in such financial operations also played a significant part in Lord Selborne's response to the JIC enquiry into SOE of December 1943. This article suggests that the significance of these financial operations is missed when SOE is examined through a geographical, country section, perspective, and argues that greater attention needs to be given to SOE's non-geographical sections.

American intelligence in war-time London: the story of the OSS

1. The British Intelligence Community: Setting the tone for OSS 2. The Genesis of OSS/London and the British dimension 3. Servants of OVERLORD: SO, SI and the invasion of Europe 4. Reductio ad absurdum R&A/London's quest for relevance 5. Falling short of the target: EOU, SIRA and the pitfalls of R&A 5. Inspired Improvization: William Casey and the penetration of Germany 6. Following the British Example: X-2 and morale operations 7. Full Circle: Anglo-American intelligence and the transition to Cold War

Covert Operations and Official Collaboration: British Intelligence's Dual Approach to Ireland during World War II

Neutral Ireland posed a unique challenge to the wartime British intelligence community and the latter responded by adopting a dual approach. On the one hand, it carried out covert intelligence operations in Irish territory, involving the Service intelligence branches, the Ministry of Information, and, most importantly, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). On the other hand, unprecedented cooperation developed between military, police and intelligence agencies from Britain and Ireland, and in particular between MI5 and Irish military intelligence (G2). For most of the war British intelligence pursued this joint strategy of covert activity and official collaboration, and MI5 and SIS shared responsibility for Ireland. However, there was a gradual shift of emphasis towards cooperation and it was eventually concluded that the MI5-G2 link could serve all Britain's security needs. This article charts this evolution and places it within the context of Anglo-Irish wartime political relations.

Creating a commonwealth intelligence culture: the view from Central Africa 1945–1965

This article examines attempts by the British intelligence community to improve the security arrangements of members of both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Commonwealth in the post-war era. The process was regarded not only as a means of countering Communist subversion and protecting Britain's key relationship with the United States, but also as a way of entrenching British influence, particularly in countries nearing independence. The result of this process was a complex network of intelligence contacts reaching across the Commonwealth. Viewing this network from the perspective of the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau (FISB), the intelligence organization of the Central African Federation, the article suggests that it offered both opportunities and dangers. It provided a potential channel for covert diplomacy. Yet it also threatened to undermine the credibility of Commonwealth intelligence chiefs whose links with the United Kingdom were perceived as being excessively close.

Fighting for relevance: Economic intelligence and special operations executive in Spain, 1943–1945

This article examines the work of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in Spain during the latter part of the Second World War. Unlike SOE's broad mandate to sow dissent and disarray in occupied countries, in Spain agents were forbidden from any involvement in direct action and sabotage. Diplomatic concerns, namely the maintenance of Spanish neutrality in the war, overrode all other strategic issues in Iberia. SOE agents and leaders in Madrid, therefore, attempted to create a different role for themselves. Drawing on files released in the Public Record Office in 1998, the article highlights SOE's limited success in the effort to establish for itself a part in the Allied strategic and diplomatic campaign against German wolfram smuggling. Success proved fleeting, however, and SOE's ultimate failure, in the face of hostility from the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), to prove its usefulness beyond the wolfram campaign, would lead to its withdrawal from Spain. The story of the SOE in Spain represents, on a small scale, the failure of the organization to find a niche in the British intelligence community after the Second World War.

OSS Against the Reich: The World War II Diaries of Colonel David K. E. Bruce (review)

162 SAISREVIEW of such magnitude as to tax the efforts of even the most enlightened leadership, and in many cases political and economic reform may exacerbate the situation. Perhaps the most serious of such problems is China's fight to control its bloated population, which, despite what Tyrene White calls "the most intrusive and limiting family planning program in the world," continues to threaten to overwhelm even the most dramatic economic growth. (Authorities estimate a population of over 1.3 billion by the year 2000.) The implications of failure in this regard cannot be overestimated, for it will have far-reaching effects on the global environment and regional stability. Despite virtual success in the cities, the remaining 75-80 percent of the population has largely succeeded in circumventing the "one-child" policy. The deterioration of Sino-American relations is also more than a transitory function ofChinese retrenchment, according to David Zweig. The end ofthe Cold War, Zweig asserts, marks the end of the "long honeymoon" stage of SinoAmerican relations and threatens a steady decline into divorce. Trade friction, arms proliferation and human rights concerns are among the primary perpetrators . Zweig sees little cause for optimism for a satisfactory resolution of these bilateral tensions in the near future, due especially, he says, to American partisan politics and Chinese paranoia in the era of a single, and increasingly intrusive, superpower. Edwin Winckler concludes the volume on an optimistic note with a look at an increasingly modernizing, democratic and enlightened society on the "other China," Taiwan, whose plans for its ever-expanding economy include turning the island into the "trade, financial and communications center ofthe western Pacific" in the next century. Left undiscussed, however, were the intangibles, the potential roadblocks to Taiwan's smooth road into the future, not the least being unknowable political developments in the cross-Strait relationship: What role might Taiwan play in a post-Old Guard China? What would be the implications for Taiwan ofa succession crisis or instability on the mainland? These and other questions remain to be answered and threaten to disturb even the best laid plans. OSS Against the Reich: The World War II Diaries ofColonel David K. E. Bruce. Edited by Nelson D. Lankford. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1991. 257 pp. $28.50/Hardcover. Reviewed by Scott E. Anderson, MA., SAIS, 1992. From early 1942 to late 1944, David K E. Bruce was the London representative of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America's intelligence organization during World War II. For much of this period, Bruce kept a detailed account of his daily activities and recorded vivid impressions of the events raging around him. His position afforded him a unique perspective on the war—high enough to have encountered many ofthe allied military leaders, yet low enough to have had regular contact with field officers and intelligence agents. The diaries, previously unpublished, are a valuable addition to the growing literature concerned with the wartime experience of the OSS. BOOK REVIEWS 163 The purpose of the OSS was to augment and aid the regular military by undermining the strength and fighting ability of the enemy. It performed a number ofdistinct functions: secret intelligence collection, research and analysis, subversive propaganda, and special operations (sabotage, demolition and assistance to partisan guerrillas). Colonel Bruce, as the senior OSS officer in London, oversaw all field operations in the European theater, maintained close links with his chief in Washington, General William Donovan, and sought to maintain cooperative relationships with the British intelligence community and the various resistance groups scattered throughout the Continent. The diaries begin with voyages from Washington, where Bruce was first based, to London and Cairo. In 1943, once he had set up his headquarters in London, Bruce then traveled to North Africa and Sicily to observe firsthand the allied invasions and to report on OSS activities in the Mediterranean. The entries from this period convey the extent to which informal channels and personal ties were necessary for the functioning of the OSS, which often encountered opposition from more orthodox military organizations. Bruce remained in London through much of 1944, where he survived the first ofthe V-I "buzz bomb" and the V-2 rocket attacks...

In Never-Never Land? the British archives on Intelligence

A leading historian of the British intelligence community has described the British public archives as ‘laundered’. Christopher Andrew was, of course, referring to the closure, sometimes deceptively, of the official records of the security services. ‘Laundered’ can cover a wide variety of sins and might even give a misleading impression. An understanding of the disposition of the historical records of British intelligence, of the prospects for access to such an archive, and the implications for research in this field, depend on more than knowledge of Whitehall practice or the state of legislation regarding public records. Such understanding depends, in the first instance, on what we mean by ‘intelligence archives’.

Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community.

Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community.

Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community

Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community

Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community

Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community

Secret service: the making of the British intelligence community

Secret service: the making of the British intelligence community